More evidence that Rumsfeld should be in prison

This is a great blog by William Arkin, military analyst for the Washington Post.

In it, he refers to a memo written by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asking "Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror?" The memo is dated October 16, 2003, more than two years after 9/11 and the October 7, 2001 initiation of the "War on Terror." Two years into it, and the head guy doesn't know if he's winning or losing? I'm sorry, but to me, the answer is very simple, if you are not winning, you are losing - and if you are winning, you know it. Ergo, the question is itself an acknowledgment that we are losing (because, yes, in this case, an indeterminate outcome equates to a loss).

One of Rumsfeld's more interesting observations is our lack of metrics to ascertain our progress. In other words, we do not have a measuring stick. This is interesting and important because it directly addresses a point raised by Michael Scheuer in his book "Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror" By way of set up, Scheuer led the CIA's bin Laden unit until 1999, and published his book as "Anonymous" due to CIA regulations. The book itself is an "open source" text (thereby saving it from being stamped "secret" and shelved) and started out as an unclassified training manual for new counterterrorism operatives working on bin Laden and Sunni extremism. (See link here).

In any event, Scheuer notes that it is impossible to determine whether our capture and/or killing of various high-profile targets has made a dent. This is because we do not have an "order-of-battle" study in place for al Qaeda. (Imperial Hubris, p.67). He says, "[w]ithout this basic reference point it is impossible to objectively determine how badly or permanently al Qaeda has been damaged." (Id). Without going into detail, he notes that we simply have no way of knowing whether we are successful.

So back to Rumsfeld. Now, two years after asking the question, the DOD has finally decided to start the process of seeking an answer. On September 8, 2005, the DOD sent out a solicitation for bids on a contract to develop "a system of metrics to accurately assess US progress in the War on Terrorism, identify critical issues hindering progress and develop, and track action plans to resolve the issues identified."

In other words, four years into the "War on Terror," and the DOD finally decides that it should maybe develop a method of evaluating its progress. Seriously, can ANYBODY whose head is not completely up their ass believe that BushCo have the first clue about what they're doing? I mean, aside from the lack of sufficient forces on the ground, the faulty intelligence, the total failure to grasp Middle Eastern and Islamic culture, and the stubborn refusal to actually engage in a real war on terror, now this? Four years into the game, and we're just now contracting to define the rules and build the scoreboard!?

One of the problems the DOD now faces is that any system it develops for measuring success/defeat will be based on a military perspective, which is incongruent with the law-enforcement mindset that dominates this alleged "War on Terror." Our policy is not to defeat terrorists through their military destruction, it is to arrest them. Occassionally, more by dumb luck than design, we manage to kill some. Scheuer argues in his conclusion that we must stop viewing bin Laden as a terrorist, because he is not. He says, "Al Qaueda attacks are terrifying, but acts of war are like that. Bin Laden is leading and inspiring a worldwide anti-U.S. insurgency; he is waging war while we fight him with counterterrorism policies dominated by law-enforcement tactics and procedures. It has not and will not work." (Imperial Hubris, p. 246) (emphasis added).

Scheuer goes on to note that, "[a]s practiced by the United States, counterterrorism is appeasment; it lets the enemy attack and survive, keeps allies sweet by staying the hand of the U.S. military forces they hate, and ignores the true terrorist states in the Sunni Persian Gulf because they own much of the world's oil. The bloated, risk-averse, and lawyer-palsied (counterterrorism) community ensured state sponsors and their proxies survived, and now it blocks the counterinsurgency strategy needed to beat al Qaeda." (Id. at 246-47).

It will be interesting to see if the DOD assessment ultimate results in a revised methodolgy that mirrors one of the issues raised in Scheuer's book. Since the days of Grant and Lee (and the Overland Campaign), the U.S. military has trained its officers to wage war with a blood-letting mindset. Massive destruction, massive casualties, unrelenting pace. Today, war is fought for the television cameras, so we get nifty pictures of laser-guided bombs. However, as Scheuer notes, "[d]ainty U.S. military attacks convince our Muslim friends and foes that America lacks the military savagery to either portect its allies or destroy its enemies, and that, despite massive U.S. military power, the Islamists can absorb U.S. attacks and fight again." Another author cited by Scheuer said, "[w]arriors will interpret such an aversion to violence as a wekness, emboldening their cause. ... For such adversaries, our moral values - our fear of colalteral damage- reperesnt our worst vulnerabilities." (Id. at 235, and quoting Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics).

In short, either wage total, unrelenting and catastrophic war on the muslim world (I didn't get into Scheuer's point that this is not a war against extremists, but against the entire Muslim world), or agree to their demands, which are, simply, get out of the Gulf. (I also did not spend time discussing his point that bin Laden, et al, do not hate us for out values, politics, or way of life - they simply want the infidels out of their holy territory). Given the two options, only the first is viable and stands any likelihood of success - like it or not.